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The precautionary principle carries great significance for ‘sustainability science’. It provides 
a powerful framework for improving the quality, decency and reliability of decisions over 
technology, science, ecological and human health, and improved regulation of risk-
burdened human affairs. It asks us to pause and to review before leaping headlong into 
innovations that might prove disastrous. Such a call does not sit well with a ‘deregulatory’ 
(i.e. environmentally-non-protecting) policy setting, nor with the expectation by corporates 
of maintaining profit in an economic climate where competition is yelping and recession is 
barking at the door. 
Because of this, the precautionary principle is now under fire. Looking across the world, we 
find a paradox. The precautionary principle is entrenched in government and legal systems 
in various places, but most strikingly in the European Union (EU).  It has a presence in the 
patterns and processes of environmental management right across the EU. It is therefore 
especially alarming that the precautionary principle is under considerable threat in the EU. 
Specifically, it may be at risk in trade treaties currently being negotiated 
(https://www.uea.ac.uk/about/media-room/eu-referendum/ttip-and-eu ); it is being challenged 
by the rival so-called Innovation Principle (http://esharp.eu/debates/innovation/the-innovation-
principle ); and it may be at severe risk in the U.K. as part of the Brexit process (see e.g. 
http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Food-Safety/Food-safety-precautionary-principle-must-
continue-post-Brexit). 
This issue of Environment both reaffirms the need for and asserts the changing nature of the 
precautionary principle. It seeks to update the precautionary principle to meet the emerging 
scientific and technological challenges of the 21st century, and in particular the sometimes 
seemingly inevitable processes of potential human-triggered harm that now hang over us. 
 
 
The precautionary principle in context 
 
Precaution emerged as a central tenet of European environmental policy in the mid 1970s 
(Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994; Jordan, 2001, Gee 2013). This period has been heralded as 
the period of expansionism in environmental policy and management. Precaution made 
sense when introducing a fundamental way of stopping realistically irreversible 
environmental problems from arising at all. During this period the precautionary principle 
gained strength partly because it was accompanied by other innovative regulatory 
approaches to environmental policy-making. These included the principle of prevention 
(better than cure); stimulation of the best available technology for increasing the efficiency 
of resource use and of preventing waste; safeguarding zones of environmental nurture in 
the face of ignorance or uncertainty by (in part) setting a cap on overall alteration; sharing 
the burden of responsibilities according to contribution and ability to pay; assuring 
proportionality of regulatory action when setting gains against losses; sharing regulatory 
responsibilities between government and commerce via responsible intervention by 
accredited non-governmental organizations; providing conditions for the survival of future 
generations and ecosystems; and making the polluter pay. The most ambitious claim of 
precaution was to place the burden of proof of not causing avoidable danger onto any 
decision-maker proposing to introduce or regulate new products, technologies or 
infrastructure developments. Its genius lay in making it clear that absence of certainty, or 
there being insufficient evidence-based analysis, were not impediments to innovation, so 
long as there was no reasonable likelihood of serious harm. Crucially, precaution enjoins 
innovatory paths not only against imposing hazard, but also to stop exposing us to any 
potential risks of such harm. 
 
The precautionary principle reached its global apogee as Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development agreed by all UN nations in 1992: 
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to 
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.1 
 
In essence, the precautionary principle imposes a duty of planetary care on the human will. 
It seeks to deepen, to widen, and to lengthen all manner of so-called impact assessments. 
Above all, it provides a basis for public discussion and deliberation over what kind of society 
and moral accountability we collectively should choose to adopt. Such decisions have to be 
collective.2 It is conceptually impossible for a society to leave it up to individuals or 
corporations to choose what technology to select when there may be all manner of 
consequences for others.3 Leaving such decisions to individuals or corporations is simply a 
defective way of expressing that collective will (or lack of will). Precaution therefore comes 
                                                 
1 We note that the term “serious or irreversible” is probably slightly unfortunate: because it may imply that 
irreversible but trivial harms need to be guarded against. Whereas presumably they don’t. So a formulation 
like “serious, especially if irreversible” would probably be a happier formulation. …Then again, the “serious or 
irreversible” formulation could be precautionarily defended, on the grounds that it can be doubted whether 
any truly irreversible change is truly trivial. 
2 This point is present powerfully in the work of Hannah Arendt; see particularly The human condition. See also 
Christopher Groves' work in recent years, and Anne Chapman’s article in this issue. 
3 Anne Chapman’s article in the present issue of Environment develops this point. See also her 
http://www.greenhousethinktank.org/uploads/4/8/3/2/48324387/greens_and_science_inside_2.pdf . 
with responsible and genuinely democratic governance, not always a popular concept in the 
harassed economies and politics of today. 
 
Precaution is more recognized in the European regulatory culture than is the case for the 
US. We take this further in our discussion of the Innovation Principle, much favored in the 
US, but under intense scrutiny in the EU. The dividing line here is the role of innovation and 
accountability to risk taking which tend to be given greater weight in US regulation and 
court procedures, along with a more flamboyant approach to learning through 
experimentation. Most of the papers in this edition of Environment explore the cost, actual 
and potential, of such flamboyance. 
 
We argue here that since the Rio Declaration, the precautionary principle has been steadily 
downgraded. For this issue we commissioned a number of illuminating companion papers to 
explain why this is the case, and to suggest what can be done about it. 
The themes of these papers are:  
 evidentiary proof (Anne Chapman) 
 liability and onus of responsibility and compensation (Iancu Daramus)  
 participatory involvement in assessment procedures for novel technologies (Ricarda 
Steinbrecher and Helena Paul) 
 the changing international dimension (Andrew Boswell) 
The main message of this package is that the sustainability process in general is being 
progressively weakened at a time when we can least afford such weakening, that various 
forms of good environmental governance are being undermined in terms of effective citizen 
participation, and that in particular the legitimate and legislative foundations of the 
precautionary principle are being dismantled and removed. 
The decline of this principle is a synecdoche for the challenges facing ‘sustainability science’. 
If future pathways of both sustainability science and a resurgent precautionary principle can 
be forged together then there is a brighter future for the entire precautionary and risk-
management process and, by extension, for humanity and its posterity.  
The precautionary principle was introduced to create a basis for thoughtful and considered 
evaluation of policy, technology, scientific discovery, and innovative ways of providing 
foresight. This enjoyed transatlantic recognition. It also tied in with emerging safeguards to 
public health and to avoidance of vulnerability to natural hazard via warnings, evacuation 
and zoning procedures. It was conceived at a time when environmental disruption, 
particularly from toxic chemicals, was becoming a matter of widespread public concern. The 
UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, opened up the issue 
of cross-border legal responsibilities for curtailing damaging pollution at source and 
strengthened the emerging national and international environmental regulatory regimes, 
particularly on the European continent. 
 As these arrangements were being put in place, it became clear that reliable information 
and prognoses were limited or imperfect. It was not possible to await confirmation of harm 
and the source of harm whilst environmental damage from neighboring countries was 
palpably occurring. Thus there was an urgent need for a mechanism which did not merely 
follow the path of normal scientific methodology. Scientists are typically concerned above 
all to avoid false positives, or ‘false alarms’. This bias explains why many scientists are 
relatively cautious in their claims and public pronouncements. If one is willing to take the 
risk of obeying (what may turn out to be) ‘false positives’, then one might be shown to 
having been more pessimistic than the circumstances warrant.  
Yet the risk of operating on the basis of false negatives is arguably far worse. Here we have 
in mind the avoidance or ignorance of a (potentially) serious unanticipated outcome.  One’s 
shining scientific reputation is of little moment, compared to possible complicity in the 
undermining of possible serious/irreversible avoidable harm. If one sticks too tightly to the 
normal scientific habit of awaiting the evidence and avoiding false alarms, one may be 
complicit in a situation where something genuinely and massively alarming and dreadful 
occurs - without one having warned against it. 
Before the introduction of the precautionary principle, the international order did not have 
a way of facilitating an appropriate methodology for scientific deliberations of this nature. 
Thus it did not have political currency for careful examination and assessment of what are 
sometimes coyly called the ‘distributional aspects’ of techno-scientific developments - the 
downsides of possible and plausible longer term outcomes from any potentially-dangerous 
initiating actions. This was also true of within-nation environmental damage notably linked 
to large infrastructure schemes such as pipelines and power stations. Hence precaution was 
established for ensuring a more reflective and weighted approach to preparing for uncertain 
and potentially destabilising global and local futures for people and nature. Precaution 
means that one no longer has to wait for proof; one can take the risk of engendering false 
positives, in order to be confident of being able to avert false negatives. In other words: in 
order not to give a false sense of reassurance that could then ‘legitimate’ actions that 
turned out to be harmful. Precaution seeks to ensure that such harms do not knowingly 
occur; it does so by reversing the normal burden of proof. 
The precautionary principle is also notable for its consideration of social and ecological 
resilience and wellbeing across all forthcoming generations. It places emphasis on political 
and moral mechanisms for widening the basis for assessing outcomes over generations to 
come and for the health of the planet as a whole. There is no other legal or regulatory 
framework for ensuring such a critical feature of human empathy and care. Precaution is a 
way of implementing a deep future-care, of the kind called for by so many, including notably 
Hans Jonas 4 and the present Pope.5  
For Aristotle, courage is the moderate position between fearfulness and rashness or 
recklessness.6 Recklessness is the absence of precaution - the absence of prudence. 
Recklessness is the stance that we are seeking to critique in this special issue. It 
characterizes much of our fundamental lack of organized care towards our ecosystems and 
the welfare of future generations. We also argue that at times a version of recklessness in 
the context of technology and of certain approaches to modeling can masquerade under the 
banner of science itself. If we are correct in this interpretation, then courage is called for in 
defending foresight and care for the future. 
 
The power of precaution in its initial formulation 
 
The precautionary principle is an heir to the German Vorsorgeprinzip (Boehmer-
Christiansen, 1994: 33–43). Though often interpreted as ‘foresight’, Vorsorge applies to 
responsible and equitable appraisal of future action. ‘Fore-care’ is a useful literal translation. 
 
Lying behind and manifested in the evolution of this interpretation were both a sense of 
provable responsibility for public, civic and private actions, and a sharing of accountability 
between the state, the change-agent and the electorate. In this sense, precaution connects 
with more recent trends in the deliberative approaches to uncertainty and forecasting, as 
well as to the question of methods of calculating (for instance) toxicity and biodiversity 
damage. 
 
Today, there is a greater willingness to accept regulatory voluntarism as an expression of 
self-styled corporate social responsibility. This is despite continuing skepticism of such 
voluntarism amongst justifiably wary public interest groups. The early rise of precaution 
relied more on formal rules of engagement and consensus amongst business, unions and 
civil society brokered by the state. Nowadays the more formal strictures of precaution are 
being undermined. The deliberate involvement of business, especially in self-regulation, and 
the moving away from pure regulatory adversarialism may lead to a weakening in the actual 
force of precautionary reasoning and law with regard to those who do not engage in 
decent/sustainable practice. It is particularly relevant that the requirement to show no 
                                                 
4 The imperative of responsibility: the search for an ethics for a technological age (Chicago: U. 
Chicago Press, 1979). 




 See Nicomachean Ethics 1107a30-1107b4. P.118 in the Broadie and Rowe edition. 
harm and to offer compensation to those who suffer from residual harm has softened both 
in legal and regulatory terms. The accompanying articles on liability and evidentiary proof 
attest to this shift of emphasis. 
 
In the UK the emergence of the prestigious and multidisciplinary Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution in 1970 (Owens 2015) coincided with a deepening ethical and even 
theological interpretation of precaution. In its path-breaking reports on radioactive waste, 
setting environmental standards, restricting marine pollution, avoiding possible toxic effects 
of pesticides and incineration, removing lead from gasoline, and exploring the scope of 
genetically modified organisms, the Commission imaginatively explored the widening of the 
precautionary principle. 
 
The thoughtful analyses by Susan Owens (2015, 76-102) of the evolution in thinking and 
conceptualization by the Royal Commission provides a wonderful insight into the changing 
context of interpreting the precautionary principle. She begins in the early years of the 
Commission’s work, in the 1970s, where there was a robust debate over the assimilative 
capacities of air and water and the need to control pollution at the emitting source rather 
than through natural cleansing processes. Both the changing characteristics of pollutants 
promoting more inorganic and synthetic components as well as the need to stimulate the 
technologies of removal brought the Commission more towards the continental approach of 
restricting discharges at source. This shift revealed the changes in both environmental and 
the composition of effluents. But it also opened up the Commission to a more moral view 
on avoidable harm as well as a greater degree of meaningful participation in the 
environmental management process.  
 
This process accompanied the rise of ‘citizen science’ and the need to recognize that public 
values underpinned all environmental standard setting and not just the views of the expert 
and the scientific elite. As a consequence, the Commission broadened its perspective on 
precaution to take into account the ethical aspects of acting and regulating under conditions 
of imperfect knowledge. It also reinforced its views on the need to be mindful of the 
distributional aspects of environmental harm on employees, on the general public, and on 
particular cultures (for example the introduction of lead based products in the cosmetic 
industry with particular exposure to women from the Indian sub-continent). 
 
What we see here in this fascinating period of the 1980s and 90s was a subtle shift in the 
discourse over precaution. Where there was a failure to take anticipatory action, especially 
where the scientific evidence was inconclusive but sufficiently robust to show likely harm 
(as in the case of bio-accumulative chemicals), it became evident to regulators that there 
was a strong ethical and legally pragmatic case for urging restriction. In this important sense 
this experience heralded the subtle shift towards the highly contentious but precautionarily-
commonsensical stance of shifting the burden of proof onto the promoter of novel 
technologies and substances. 
 
What was also occurring during this period was a changing notion of the role of the 
environmental scientist. The remarkable story of the removal of lead in gasoline in the early 
1980s (RCEP 1983) was a classic example of challenging the received wisdom of much 
decorated health scientists. They became regarded as too close to the automotive and oil 
industries. In addition, the extremely spirited campaigns of the anti-lead activists (Wilson 
1983), as well as more general feeling that playing with the possible decline of intelligence 
in children (particularly those living in poor areas with high levels of car-borne air pollution) 
was plain wrong. Here we see the vital connection between scientific assessments and a 
deep sense of ethical responsibility.  
 
This case may well in fact be one of many examples where an innovation enjoined by 
precaution (i.e. removing lead from fuel) has led to systemic spin-off benefits. There is some 
evidence that the decrease in crime over recent decades is due to the removal of lead from 
fuel.7  If this is true the benefits of removing lead will have been far greater than was 
thought at the time.   
Recent work by researchers at Lancaster University found active carbonaceous particles 
from exhaust emissions in brains and concluded that this might be causal in developing 
Alzheimer’s.8  A recent study in Canada suggested that risk of Alzheimer’s was greater for 
people living near busy roads.9 Of course, these studies are not decisive. The point is that 
they provide further precautionary reasons for bringing down the level of atmospheric 
pollution coming from motor vehicles, and for various associated policy responses 
(restricting and even eliminating the diesel engine, reducing the need to travel, adjusting 
idling to the point of automatic shut-off, and locating schools further from main roads). 
 
The Royal Commission’s investigations are highlighted here as they reveal more generally 
the changing context of precaution over the past 25 years. In terms of sustainability science, 
the lifeblood of this Magazine, the rise of knowledge brokering as more of a participatory 
conversation, the emergence of the scientist as a learner as much as a practitioner, and the 
more recent emphasis on empathy as a key ingredient in sustainability decision-making are 
taking place as part of the evolution of the precautionary concept. We observe the 
emergence of deliberative procedures in relation to such areas as geo-engineering, genetic 
modification, nano technology, and the medical ethics surrounding such delicate matters as 
                                                 





stem cell research and triple donors of sperm and eggs through a process covered in an 
accompanying article by Paul and Steinbrecher as ‘Gene Drives’. 
 
In all of this we see a fascinating relationship between precaution holding on, but doing so 
in a setting of much more widespread social and scientific change. Part of our message here 
is that the synergy of the two sets of progressions, namely precaution clinging on rather 
tenuously, and sustainability science emerging a little more strongly, provides a healthy 
introduction to but not a reliable basis for any successful progress for sustainability science. 
 
In all of this flurry of mid-1980s legislation, the precautionary principle was invoked to 
ensure that the integrity of ecosystems-functioning was protected, that primary biodiversity 
was enhanced, and that human health and wellbeing were given attention, especially where 
minority rights of class, ethnicity, gender and culture and the welfare of future generations 
were concerned. In its early formulation(s), precaution championed the interests of the two 
unseen and unheard components of the planet: future generations, especially of the poor 
and politically disadvantaged, and ecological assemblages and interconnections, which 
combine to retain life and habitability on this arguably unique planet. 
 
We turn to contemporary environmental governance and politics to see just how well these 





The original ideals for precaution, especially shifting the burden of proof onto the promoter, 
together with strong and social justice driven regulatory arrangements, have been 
weakening, arguably at the very time that they need strengthening. This is in part a direct 
result of deregulatory pressure. In the case of toxic pesticides, for example, the evidence is 
instructive. A group of pesticides known as neonicotinoids, closely associated with damage 
to insect pollinators, especially bees, should have been banned on the basis of precaution 
(Environmental Audit Committee 2014). Instead, after extensive lobbying by the farming 
and agro-chemical industries, the European Commission announced initially a three-year 
temporary ban to explore the outcomes of the trial removal. It is impossible for ecological 
science to prove one way or another that such a ‘fallow period’ would show the effects on 
bee populations which are under attack from many sources. A new study (Woodcock et al 
2017) conducted in three countries, found that neonicotinoids were associated with 
declines in the reproduction of both honey bees and wild bees. Yet a companion study 
(Stockstad et al 2017), carried out only in Germany, claimed that some bee populations 
seemed to be unaffected. Such apparently contradictory findings evoke our comments on 
scientists’ sometimes-excessive wariness of false positives just as the EU is poised 
completely to ban this widely used and in agricultural circles very popular pesticide.  
 The precautionary response of the EU here seems to us well warranted: the key point being 
that the complexity and time-lags of ecology imply that, when the stakes are high (as they 
are with bees), rash profit-seeking is irrational. Moreover, the uncertainties are raised 
further because of the intersection with  global over-heat (i.e. temperature shifts), and 
consequent rising levels of pathogens, which are or are likely to be affecting the habitats 
and genetics of bees. Pollinating plants are shifting in composition and location, while 
changes in vegetation are confusing bees’ foraging practices.  
 
The kinds of discussion initiated by the Royal Commission and by the UK Environmental 
Audit Committee shows that inconclusive evidence can, unfortunately, act as a restraint on 
the application of precaution, especially where that evidence is unusual or untested, as is 
the case with climate change relevant effects.10 So it is easier for politically well-situated 
lobbies, who are extremely well financed and politically connected, to create doubt in the 
minds of the regulator or legislator. And in a world where the agro-chemical companies are 
seeking to respond to public concerns at least notionally, it is harder for the precaution-
favoring campaigners to get political leverage. In this important sense the changing political 
and regulatory dynamics associated with the production and use of the very substances 
which used to trigger precautionary actions, are nowadays working against the basic 
principles of the concept. This seems to us a matter of grave regret. 
 
 
A ‘case study’: genetically modified organisms 
 
On the key battle front of genetically modified organisms, the role of precaution has 
coincided with widespread public disquiet throughout Europe (but not so much in North or 
South America and Asia) over the introduction of non-natural genes into living organisms, 
especially food crops. Here the application of precaution coincided with, and hence helped 
to buttress and articulately expressed pre-existing opposition by consumers. In the UK a 
three- year public listening process over the viability and safeguards over GM crops and 
foods resulted in persistent and continued outrage (Horlick-Jones et al 2007; see also 
Steinbrecher and Paul in this issue). Such opposition is pragmatically accepted by many 
major European food producers and retailers, so there is no effective commercial lobby in 
favor of GMOs except by the plant scientists and agricultural intensifiers. We see in this 
example of how it is possible for precaution still to have a role. But such a role probably has 
to be subsumed into a wider and more potent political anger supported in turn by the 
faltering emergence of ‘caring capitalism’. Acting on its own, precaution is nowadays a 
weakened scientific and political weapon. But working supportively in resonant political or 
                                                 
10 We return to this point below, in exploring the typically determinative importance of massive, previously-
unseen/unknown events: such as sudden ‘jumps’ or feedbacks in the climate system, when it passes novel 
thresholds. 
economic contexts, reference to the precautionary principle, especially when the timing for 
novel decisions is right, can tip the balance. 
 
GMOs form one of the main examples both in the EU and elsewhere where the 
precautionary principle is being efficaciously employed to prevent something potentially 
dangerous which companies might otherwise have risked pursuing. This is taking place in 
response to a supposedly ‘scientific consensus’ that GMOs are safe. Even if such 
consensus was in existence, there is still a risk-asymmetry. A 99% consensus that a plane is 
safe is not acceptable: the US Federal Aviation Authority standard is for an operational 
safety of more than 99.99%.  On the other hand, a mere 20% consensus that human-
triggered climate change is real is already more than sufficient for us to worry deeply. An 
equivalent attitude to risk means that we should also take the dangers of GM technology 
very seriously indeed. The point is that, if we seek to weigh the proportionate consequences 
of the benefits of pursuing GMO crops or food, compared with the costs of not doing so, the 
‘balance’ cannot be struck, if the downside is sufficiently bad.11 A sufficiently negative 
exposure in a ‘tail-risk’, even if the risk is adjudged as unlikely to be realized, outweighs any 
potential benefit12.  
 
Establishing these thought-processes, putting them to the test, is precaution in action. A 
safety-first approach would not accept the meme that GM crops, having been tested for 20 
years, are safe. For 20 years is no time at all on an ecological let-alone an evolutionary time-
scale. Without careful controlled and independent long-term study at organism and 
ecological scales (study which, at our current state of technology, it is hard to see how it 
could be safely undertaken at all), it is incorrect to claim the GMOs have in general been 
shown to be safe. And precaution requires us to put safety first. 
  
New transgenic techniques (see Steinbrecher and Paul’s article in this issue) are allegedly a 
more precise extension of other breeding techniques. But it would be a false opposition to 
paint opponents of GM as necessarily supporters of all ‘conventional’ breeding techniques, 
such as mutation by radiation. What the precautionary principle enjoins is the requirement 
to search for solutions that are not potentially ruinous. Such solutions as agroecology, seed-
saving and permaculture do exist. To help arrive at the best decisions/solutions is where the 
deliberative roles of the proportionality test come in. 
 
                                                 
11 See http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/pp2.pdf . (Our deep thanks to Nassim Taleb for direct 
inspiration for with regard to this section of the present article.) 
 
12 We pick this point up in "New frontiers for precaution", below. 
In this series of four articles we note a number of common themes which bear on our 
discussion to this point. Anne Chapman looks at the role of evidence both from an ethical 
perspective and in relation to synthetic chemicals. She seeks to place both libertarianism 
and utilitarianism in the context of community based common harm. There are all manner 
of toxic substances and processes which may afflict the vulnerable or the next generation 
where evidence alone is not a sufficient moral or scientific guide. Chapman persuasively 
argues that higher standards of risk assessment should apply where individuals cannot 
escape the general harm and especially where vital but threatened ecological niches and 
processes are endangered. Here is where there should be higher standards of participation 
and more requirement of precautionary progress with clear liability on the generator of 
novel products. 
 
Iancu Daramus extends this line by showing that there are two corporate based arenas 
where liability and higher standards of precaution can and should be accommodated. One is 
the fiduciary duty placed on trustees and directors regarding the safeguards of wellbeing 
over generations. Here, he argues, higher standards of evidentiary proof should be required. 
Like Chapman and Steinbrecher and Paul, he makes a strong case for a more participatory 
sustainability science. Daramus also assesses the changing role of the financial and 
prudential regulators over corporate governance. It is becoming possible for the courts to 
demand that corporations take into account long term and uncertain climate change 
outcomes in the design and financial justification of their business strategies. In essence 
there is an emerging world of ‘stress testing’ for climate impact sensitivity. 
 
Andrew Boswell takes these arguments into the international climate governance regimes. 
He seeks a more precautionary based approach to emerging climate regimes based on 
human rights, principles of fairness, and disaster prevention. He examines international law 
to show that rights based and justice linked approaches to handling precaution are now on 
the cards. But Boswell would like to go further. He seeks an extension of the body of law to 
encase the latest science of anthropogenic climate change and adaptation as the basis for 
future legally binding agreements. Ideally he would even change the fundamental basis of 
international law towards the strongest precautionary action on the basis that any further 
delay in emissions reduction would now likely be catastrophic (see the UN World 
Meteorological Association Status Report on the Global Climate 2016, 2017). We examine 
this particular issue below. Suffice it to say here that such calls, supported by climate 
science, are the very kind of reason why the precautionary principle is being so critically 
scrutinized. 
     
 
Updating the precautionary principle 
 It is in the ‘pro-growth’ atmosphere of contemporary politics that the precautionary 
principle has been aggressively targeted by those who seem determined to prevent 
anything preventing the free rein of the ‘free market’ (American Enterprise Institute, 2016). 
There is an intriguing alliance of science and free-enterprise ideology in the contemporary 
attack on precaution. Free-enterprise advocates argue that, unless there is strong evidence 
of harm, then precaution is merely a pointless bar on innovation and profit-making. Paul 
and Steinbrecher point to the growing enthusiasm for the ‘innovation principle’ by the 
powerful pharmaceutical companies. Here the call is for the benefits of innovation to be 
weighed against known harm. This is a fundamental undermining of the original concepts of 
the precautionary principle. There is now a stand-off between this position and that of 
advocates of precaution who do not find sufficient support from scientists who are, as 
outlined above, extremely hesitant about potentially being responsible for false alarms, and 
who tend to rely upon a narrower evidence-based methodology.  
 
When viewed in the proper context of philosophy/methodology of science and statistics, 
this so-called evidence-based stance is found wanting. Crucially, much of what is called 
evidence by those who want to downgrade the precautionary principle in the name of 
science and in support of free enterprise, is not statistically significant, especially, in relation 
to the potential for more or less catastrophic events (Taleb 2007; see also Taleb, Read et al 
2014). Such events are by definition rare, so usually barely-evidenced. Where substantial 
evidence in the true sense of the word is lacking, the precautionary principle ought to fill the 
breach.13 In practice, it will only do so by a deliberate act of political or legal will for the 
most part spurred on by the public interest lobbies.  
 
Serious irreversible harms are often determinative. This means that they far outweigh 
variations in the more normal run of events. Viewed in a suitably long term perspective, the 
kinds of vast potential harms that precaution is invoked to prevent, when they occur, 
matter far more than smaller harms and indeed than the kinds of small or even large 
benefits that scientists/technologists and free-marketeers may be keen to create. 




Brexit and the precautionary principle 
 
                                                 
13 Anne Chapman provides a robust moral and scientific support for this position. 
A particular threat to the precautionary principle in the UK, is connected to the UK leaving 
the EU in the next few years.14 The precautionary principle is present in UK law primarily 
through its being present in EU law. Prompted by one of us (Read), Caroline Lucas MP 
recently inquired in the UK Parliament about the status of the precautionary principle in the 
‘Brexit’ process. The response from the government minister was that: 
 
Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union requires that EU legislation on the 
environment be based on the precautionary principle. The Prime Minister has announced a Repeal Bill to 
convert EU law into domestic British law, to provide certainty for consumers, workers and businesses by 
maintaining existing laws. 
 
For the time being the precautionary principle is unchanged in UK law. It will be ‘imported’ 
into UK law along with everything else in EU law, as part of the Great Repeal process. 
Nevertheless, it will then be potentially vulnerable to removal or amendment by a simple 
UK parliamentary majority without full scrutiny. Much will depend on the legal and political 
procedures still to emerge. Unless the precautionary principle is specifically incorporated 
into a preamble of any new UK law, or appears as part of formal UK policy in the form of 
being incorporated into a White Paper (a legal guide to policy setting) then its current role 
will end (Haigh 2015). That could open the door to much weakened forms of regulation over 
the topics covered in our accompanying articles such as synthetic biology, GMOs, geo-
engineering experimentation, and emissions pathways. This appears to have been one of 
the motives for the Brexiteers wanting to leave the EU.15 
 
 
New frontiers for precaution 
 
In fields such as endocrine-disruption and radiation, it is now clear that “the dose does not 
always make the poison’’. Lower doses can be more harmful than higher doses.16 This 
sounds paradoxical. In order to see that it is possible, consider as an exemplar what a high 
dose of radiation may do to a cell: kill it. That is harmful, but potentially less harmful than 
what a lower dose may do to a cell: turn it cancerous. 
 
It is increasingly unclear whether there is any safest low dose of some forms of some toxic 
substances. This challenges the so-called ‘de minimis’ principle of risk-regulation, very 
influential in the U.S., which seeks to impose minimum percentage-levels (e.g. one part in a 
                                                 
14 Here is a recent example of the threat: http://www.cityam.com/253506/shelve-eus-anti-innovation-
precautionary-principle . 
15 http://www.endsreport.com/article/54076/paterson-calls-for-shift-away-from-precautionary-principle . (See 
also http://www.endsreport.com/article/55026/leadsom-to-roll-back-eu-environmental-farm-rules ) 
16 Here is a useful example, from the literature: see the first couple of 
paragraphs: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4429934/  
million) below which substances can be assumed to involve no risk. The prima facie 
question-mark against the old notion that ‘the dose makes the poison’ yields a revolutionary 
new argument favoring the strengthening and wider deployment of the precautionary 
principle. Until we are presented with strong empirical grounds for believing otherwise, we 
need to consider (and act on) the possibility in any new field or novel technology that lower 
doses might be more harmful than higher doses. Absence of evidence of harm at high doses 
not only does not imply evidence of absence of any harm. It also no longer implies absence 
of harm even at lower doses. 
 
There has been some recognition of this kind of point.17 But so far as we can tell there has 
not been any serious philosophical/statistical/risk-analytical discussion of the phenomenon 
and its implications. 
  
Our suggestion here is that an extended argument for precaution can be applied to any new 
arena of contentious toxicity as examined by Anne Chapman. Until one has reliable 
epidemiological good reason to believe that a low dose actually is safe, one should 
precautiously assume that it is not. Thus, in contrast to what is widely assumed, there is 
good reason here to believe that there may be no safe dose of any novel product or process 
which is not yet fully tested.18 This leaves open the theme of how does one safely or 
ethically conduct such tests.19 
 
The fields of philosophy and sustainability science need to deepen their understanding of 
these matters. Sustainability science needs to move beyond the lingering fixation upon 
evidence alone, and upon relatively short time-scales that has left even this approach to 
science at times comparatively open to unwanted alliances with those who want to restrict 
further the precautionary principle. Sustainability science in alliance with ethics, philosophy, 
statistics, and with activism, can reshape the image and governance role of those areas of 
science that matter most, publicly and consequentially, for the age of ‘Anthropocene’.  
 
                                                 
17 See e.g. this impressive European Parliament 
resolution: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0027+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
18 The word “novel” here is crucial. There are plenty of things that we know are safe because we have used 
them since time immemorial, and indeed have co-evolved with them. The precautionary principle’s ‘natural 
home’ is in relation to novelty that threatens disaster, the form of genuine novelty found in (for instance) the 
synthesization of new chemicals, not the less-threatening novelty involved in simply innovating within the 
context of what is familiar, natural, or known as safe. 
19 The point here is similar to that that implied above concerning what a really safe testing regime would be for 
GM crops/food. The point is this: if one lacks a technology that would enable really safe testing, then 
precaution enjoins that one should wait, and not test, let alone roll out the technology, until one has the 
ability to conduct such testing safely. Otherwise, the ‘testing’ is itself reckless. 
Reformulating sustainability science into a more ethics-based framework would help to put 
precaution back in its rightful place. A place where it might yet help prevent the economic 
forces intent on stripping out our common protections from succeeding. Those forces are 
gaining ground just as we so clearly – indeed, desperately - need safeguards against our 
species’ own excesses and unknown future harms. We commend this issue of Environment 
to you, and hope that you will join us in thinking through – and acting on – the reasons why 
the Precautionary Principle can manifest exactly such a safeguard. 
 
 
Box 1.  Ethical considerations 
We should recognize as did Socrates that often the wisest path is to admit that we are more 
ignorant than we like to believe. We should accept that we live in a world that in many ways 
we do not fully understand. We should learn to live in a world of varying levels of ignorance 
and uncertainty, rather than harboring hubristic, dangerous ambitions for ‘total’ explanation 
and mastery. It is precisely for living in such a world that the precautionary principle is 
designed. 
 
We should acknowledge when there are or might be insufficiencies with our models and 
evidence, as presented in the accompanying papers. When we then create plans of action 
we should also consult those familiar with philosophy and statistics. 
 
Where the stakes are high, we should err decisively on the side of caution. We should reject 
claims of high degrees of safety when the evidence on which those claims are based is not 
solidly statistically grounded. We must recognize when such evidence does not encompass 
drastic possible outliers which could distort the whole graph, particularly when the long 
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